Based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), both income inequality and poverty are considered for Germany in front of and during the economic crisis 2008-2010. This comprises binary logistic regressions where it is tested whether a person is belonging to a certain income region or not. The units of analysis are differentiated by residential status, nationality, sex, age, household size/household type, employment status, etc. For instance, the likelihood of unemployed persons for being located in the low-income region weakly increased between 2007 and 2009. Those microeconomic calculations are correlated with the macroeconomic variables economic growth, inflation, and general unemployment. At the peak of the crisis -in 2009 -inequality dropped, and it increased afterwards. Poverty was not affected very much by economic developments during the crisis but at least an in-crease of persons, who stayed within the poverty region, occurred between
Introduction
To consider such aspects means analysing the relationship between macroeconomic developments and distributional, microeconomic aspects (concerning this topic see, on principle, Bourguignon, Bussolo, and Peirera da Silva 2008 and, referring to former crises, Aaberge et al. 2008 or Baldacci, de Mello, and Inchauste 2002) . Most of the studies on the impact of the newest economic crisis on inequality and/or on poverty investigate the corresponding effects for developing countries (see, e. g., McCord and Vandemoortele 2009 or Habib et al. 2010) or for countries which are severely weakened by the crisis (like Greece; see, in this context, Matsaganis and Leventi 2011 or Matsaganis 2011 ).
Contrary to those analyses, this paper focuses on the distributional influences of the crisis in a highly industrialized, economically very developed country. This appears of interest insofar as the German economy is an export-oriented one so that it is very sensitive to international disturbances like those generated by the current global financial crisis. Because of that, for Germany, the question arises in which way such burdens of the crisis are distributed among the several social groups. In this context, it must be taken into account of what welfare state's type the German society currently is. If the presumption is true that Germany -despite a certain political break towards liberal ideas since the turn of the millennium -is still a corporatist welfare state, at least basically, then it may be predicted that Germany has compensated negative distributional consequences out of the crisis (i. e., more inequality, more poverty, etc.) at a high rate.
My paper is structured as follows. The macroeconomic framework during the observation period is sketched in Section 2. It follows, in Chapter 3, the description of the methodical and data framework. In Chapter 4 overall empirical findings for Germany 2002-2010 are presented. Chapter 5 exemplarily uses the findings of the preceding chapter with respect to structural aspects of the German income distribution. Finally, concluding remarks are the topic of Chapter 6.
Macroeconomic background
The macroeconomic background sketched in this paper refers to the main macroeconomic indicators inflation rate, growth rate, and unemployment rate (most of data presented in this section is from http://www.destatis.de; i. e., from the website of the German Statistical Office, the Statistisches Bundesamt, and from OECD 2011 and OECD Economic Outlook Database: http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3746,en_2649_34573_2483901_1_1_1_1,00.html; because of partly different definitions unemployment data diverge from each other to a small degree). The latter development -revealing a relatively good performance of the German economy during the crisis (on a macroeconomic level) -was reflected in the development of the number of unemployed persons (in the definition of the German Labour Office, i. e., related to the number of civil gainfully, dependently employed persons Table 1 had to accept negative rates of change of the real gross domestic product. Furthermore, all countries were confronted with diminishing inflation rates for the2008-2009 transition compared to the 2007-2008 transition. Contrary to these findings, the countries of the conservative-corporatist welfare state type performed best concerning unemployment rates (by tendency) in front of and during the crisis -perhaps due to their modest level of decommodification and to a higher degree of governmental protection. Out of this group of countries, Germany reached the best results since it reduced its unemployment rates before and after the crisis markedly, and at the peak of the crisis in 2009 the German unemployment rate was broadly similar to the preceding year (only +0.1 percentage point according to the OECD definition of unemployment rates). This change distinctively contrasted to the development, e. g., in the United States (+3.5 percentage points), in the Euro area (+1.9 percentage points), or within the group of OECD countries (+2.2 percentage points) between 2008 and 2009. Table 2 ). Against the backdrop of the important productivity losses between 2008 and 2009 sketched above, the number of unemployed persons grew only in the amount of about 156,000 persons during both years which was -at least to some degreethe result of a rise of short-time working. Table 2 reveals that between 2008 and 2009 in Germany short-time working increased by a factor of more than 10 from about 100,000 persons to more than 1.1 Mio persons. In the succeeding years 2009 and 2010 the number of unemployed persons dropped from 3.4 Mio persons to 3.2 Mio persons which were accompanied by an approximately halving of the number of short-time workers. These results illustrate the relatively good performance of the German economy during the economic crisis by using fiscal programmes and, not least, by applying the sociopolitical measure of short-time working -the "German answer" to the economic crisis (see Brenke, Rinne, and Zimmermann 2011, p. 1) .
The public instrument of short-time working helps companies to retain workers during economic recessions by compensating workers for losses of income through paying transfers; its scope was enlarged during the crisis, and its total costs increased from 0. 
Methodical and data framework
The macroeconomic developments sketched in the preceding section constitute the framework for the paper's main part, for its microeconomic, distributional considerations with respect to inequality and poverty. Thereby, the paper focuses on income inequality and income poverty since income appears to be a suitable predictor for other welfare categories (see, in this context, already Townsend 1979, p. 253 and pp. 256-262) . More specific, the equivalent household net incomes are weighted by the number of persons in each household.
The income and other microdata used in this paper is from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP; see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007) for the years 2002 to 2010. The SOEP, which is collected since 1984 in annual intervals, currently comprises approximately 10,000 households and 25,000 persons. Since there has been a fundamental extension of the database in 2002 by high-income receivers, which -obviously not fully captured by adequate grossing-up factors within the SOEP sampleshas caused bias in the database, the analyses in the following start with the year 2002.
The SOEP offers information on monthly household income of the current year and on annual household income of the previous year. Despite the Canberra Group's guidelines in favour of annual income levels (see UN 2011, pp. 26-27 ) I decided to primarily use monthly, current household net income in my analyses below since the corresponding current income levels are more "fresh" in memories of interviewees than information on annual, retrospective income is.
1 Moreover, current monthly income belongs to the same period of time as socio-demographic characteristics while annual, retrospective income lags by one year compared with the socio-demographic variables. Another rather practical reason is that the SOEP time series for the annual incomes of the previous years, currently available for scientific purposes, ends in 2009 while monthly income additionally takes into account the year 2010 which -for purposes of comparison -provides further information on the evaluation of the economic crisis and its consequences in Germany.
In order to "normalize" household net incomes because of different household sizes and compositions, it is necessary to divide household net incomes by equivalence scales. Typically, in this context overall equivalence scales are used which assign the same scale values to households in different income regions. In contrast, there are good reasons for basing distributional analyses on variable, income-dependent equivalence scales since it might be argued, for example, that credit constraints for households in the bottom income range may shift the consumption bundles of these households towards lower expenditure shares of durables which are connected with relatively high economies of scale (see, e. g., Faik 2012).
I refer to this approach with variable equivalence scales since it allows, amongst others, a needsrelated allocation of inequality developments to different income regions before and during the crisis. In this context I, mainly, assume the following income regions: 1 Nevertheless, alternative calculations on the basis of annual income values are available from the author on request, which, on principle, do not contradict to the main findings of the income concept used in this article. 2 The article's calculations are restricted to single-to six-person households since the number of cases for household sizes with seven and more persons within the SOEP database is too low for statistical reasons. 3 Buhmann et al.'s equivalence scale formula is as follows: Buhmann et al. 1988, p. 119 [m h : equivalence scale value of household type h (with respect to the reference household type, in this case a single-person household), S: household size, : elasticity of the equivalence scale with regard to household size (and therefore also reflecting the degree of economies of scale)].
 Middle-income region: for single persons middle-income lines 70 or more percent up to (below) 200 % of their mean net incomes, and for multi-person households calculation of middleincome lines on the basis of θ = 0.8 for the lower boundary and of θ = 0.7 for the upper boundary (i. e., "deflating" incomes within the middle-income region by θ = 0.7);
 High-income region: for single persons high-income line at 200 % of their mean net incomes, and for multi-person households calculation of high-income lines on the basis of θ = 0.7 but (approximately) "deflating" incomes within the high-income region via new OECD scale, i. e., by θ = 0.6.
For the measurement of equivalent household net income's inequality, the mean logarithmic deviation, an entropy indicator proposed by Theil, and the normalized coefficient of variation (= half the square of the coefficient of variation) are used as inequality indicators, and in the field of poverty measurement the headcount and the poverty gap ratio are the preferred poverty indicators. . In summary, both crises are comparable insofar as at the peak of each crisis income inequality decreased and afterwards, typically, increased. Therefore, the German ("conservative-corporatist") welfare state's system, which is characterized by at least medium strength redistribution (see, e. g., Eberharter 2008, p. 173) , is, intrinsically, not very prone to a crisis with respect to income inequality. 
Inequality and poverty findings for

Value of inequality indicator
Mean logarithmic deviation (MLD):
Theil's entropy measure (T): The overall development of inequality can be decomposed into three elements: into population shares, relative income positions, and group-specific inequality changes within different income groups. In this context, tendentially, the observed strengthening of the population shares of the middle class andto a minor degree -of the upper income classes tended, ceteris paribus, to increase German inequality between 2006 and 2009 since especially the upper income class had a higher degree of within-group inequality (see Table 3 ). In the opposite direction the development of relative income positions has acted: That means, also ceteris paribus, a leveling at least between 2006 and 2008 and only small contrary effects between 2008 and 2010. Concerning group-specific normalized coefficients of variation, the values within the low-income and within the middle-income region remained approximately constant during the period 2006-2010 while the normalized coefficient of variation within the highincome region decreased by tendency so that, on balance, the entire within-group inequality dropped during this period of time. The same happened with respect to between-group inequality (as a consequence of the levelling effects of the relative income positions which seem to over-compensate thesmall -oppposite effects of the population shares). Altogether, these developments led to declining overall income inequality between 2008 and 2009. Summarizing and roughly speaking, concerning monthly equivalent household net incomes, this diminishment of overall inequality was primarily caused by levelling effects of the relative income positions and of the normalized coefficients of variations within the high-income region. 
Micro-simulations
In order to consider the preceding decompositions and their development more comprehensive, several micro-simulations are undertaken. These micro-simulations are performed as static shift-share calculations. Concretely, they rest on constant population shares, constant mean incomes within the differentiated (age) groups, and constant income deviations (inequality) within the several (age) groups (referring to a base year). Table A .1 in the Appendix gives an overview about the fundamental data concerning population shares, mean incomes, income inequality, and group-specific poverty within the several age groups for Germany 2002-2010.
In order to elaborate the development during crisis 2008-2010, the base year of micro-simulations is 2007 so that shift-share decompositions are as follows:
(1) Constant population shares:
(2) Constant relative income positions:
(3) Constant group-specific normalized coefficients of variation: led ceteris paribus to higher inequality levels than otherwise. This is caused by decreasing population weights of younger persons which, by tendency, had a more regular within-group distribution of individual incomes. Since overall income inequality has decreased during crisis, thus, in accordance with Section 4.1.1, the sketched effect of population shares was over-compensated by other effects which will be discussed in the following.
Keeping group-specific relative income positions constant (at the level of 2007), generates higher inequality values during the crisis (2008-2010) than before. Because of that, the changes of groupspecific relative income positions over time tended to reduce income inequality via levelling effects between the relative income positions of the several age groups, even during the economic crisis.
Finally, constant group-specific normalized coefficients of variation on the basis of 2007 would have led ceteris paribus to higher income inequality during crisis. In summary, the levelling of groupspecific means and standard deviations caused inequality decreasing effects during the economic crisis 2008-2010 which confirms the conclusions derived in Section 4.1.1. 
Poverty value (in percent)
Headcount ratio: number of the poor divided by population's number; poverty gap ratio: one minus relation of poor's arithmetic mean and value of poverty line Source: Present author's own calculations
Macroeconomic variables versus income inequality and poverty
As can be seen by Table 4 , between 2002 and 2010 the correlations between macroeconomic variables and distributional indicators have been positive. For these years, this indicates that inflation, growth, and unemployment (statistically) operated in the same direction as inequality and poverty did. The correlation within the distributional indicators was very small and nearly zero so that higher (lower) degrees of inequality were not accompanied by aligned developments in the field of poverty, and, at least partly, this finding points to changes in other income regions than in the poverty region affecting entire income inequality, as was already discussed in Section 4.1. Additionally, Table 5 summarizes the developments of macroeconomic variables as well as of inequality and poverty indicators during the crises 2002-2004 and 2008-2010 . For the macroeconomic variables, typical business-cycle movements occurred (quite expected). Moreover, in the field of inequality the developments of the different indicators were coherent between both crises: Up to the peak of each crisis, inequality increased, and afterwards it decreased. The picture concerning poverty was much obscurer. All one can conclude is that poverty did not change severely so that economic crises did not affect poverty conspicuously in Germany. Inflation rate
NCV: normalized coefficient of variation, MLD: mean logarithmic deviation, T: Theil's entropy indicator, H: headcount ratio, I: poverty gap ratio (all indicators multiplied by 100 in order to obtain percent values); p.: percentage points Sources: Present author's own calculations (based on Figures 1-3) 
Stratification of the German income distribution 2002-2010
In this chapter, the analysis of the socio-demographic structures within several income regions in Germany in front of and during the crisis is realised in a cross-sectional perspective by processing binary logistical regressions as well as in a longitudinal perspective by computing transition matrices.
Binary logistical regressions
The descriptive findings of Chapter 4 are supplemented by a binary logistical regression's model. In Table A .2 in the Appendix it becomes evident that within that framework small households -defined as such with two persons at the maximum -have significant parameter values in all three regions with the expected negative algebraic sign in the low-income region and with positive signs in the middleand in the high-income region (which was expected as well). Furthermore, the estimates presented in Table A .2 indicate significantly higher levels of well-being for German and for male household members as well as for persons living in western Germany. Furthermore, the estimates show (at most) significantly higher levels of well-being for married persons and for very qualified persons compared with the corresponding reference groups.
Contrasting old household members ("60 years and older") and young household members ("until 29 years") against the reference (dummy) group "30-59 years", reveals that young and older persons have higher likelihoods for being within the low-income region and lower likelihoods for being located within the middle-and within the high-income region.
Concerning the variable "unemployed" the parameter is strongly positive in the low-income region and strongly negative in the middle-and in the high-income region, indicating -on average -a relatively low well-being level for unemployed persons in Germany 2002-2010. In front of and at the peak of the economic crisis -i. e., between 2007 and 2009 -the parameter of unemployed persons for belonging to the low-income region increased slightly, and their parameters for belonging to the highincome region decreased by tendency. Thus, the well-being position of unemployed persons in Germany was reduced directly before and during the economic crisis weakly (afterwards the corresponding likelihoods fell as well in the low-as in the high-income region; see Figure 5 ). Again, in Germany economic crises seem to have certain but rather minor effects on the well-being position of crucial social groups like the unemployed. 
Transition matrices
Behind all cross-sectional findings presented hitherto the longitudinal perspective is concealed. However, the consideration of temporal transitions between the different income regions is instructive to cover income dynamics. Thus, in Table A In extension to the former differentiations and to investigate transitions in more detail, the bottom income region is split into "poverty region" (poverty line at 0.5 times mean of single-person households' net incomes and θ = 0.80) and into "low-income region" (up to 0.7 times mean of single-person households' net incomes and θ = 0.75), and the medium part of income distribution is divided into "middle-income region" (up to 1.5 times mean of single-person households' net incomes and θ = 0.70) and into "wealthiness region" (up to twice mean of single-person households' net incomes and θ = 0.65). The fifth class is "richness region" (twice and more than mean of single-person households' net incomes; θ = 0.60).
As can be seen by Table A Especially the ups and downs out of and into the lower income regions appear interesting in our context. In this sense, Figure 6 contains ups and downs where those between 2007 and 2010 are particularly important. Only one striking development emerges, namely that of diminishments for the ups out of poverty. Hence, during the crisis an upwards movement of the members of the low-income classes became difficult which is in accordance with the finding of increased shares of stayers within the poverty region during the crisis.  Inequality of (monthly) incomes decreased as well as income poverty (in a per-head perspective) did up to the peak of the crisis in 2009 (by tendency).
 The well-being position of unemployed persons became worsened, and the relative number of upwards movements out of lower income regions into higher well-being classes decreased; this indicates a "hardening" of the relatively bad well-being situation of the less privileged in the German society during the crisis.
Germany as a member of Esping-Andersen's conservative-corporatist welfare state regime is characterized by a kind of social policy which is, by tendency, designed to guarantee a high extent of income inequality and relatively low poverty rates (see, e. g., Eberharter 2008, p. 173 , who has empirically compared German redistribution policy with the one in the United States). The latter became very obvious during the crisis of 2008-2010 since the German income distribution (monthly incomes) became more regular than before, especially -and analogous to the crisis of 2002-2004 -at the top of the crisis. Concerning the "new" crisis and besides fiscal programmes, this was, primarily, generated by benefit payments (especially as payments for short-time workers) and by income losses within the upper income regions. *: significant at 10-percent level; **: significant at 5-percent level; ***: significant at 1-percent level 1) unemployed and non-working, 2) no school-leaving qualification achieved, 3) university degree (or the like) achieved Source: Present author's own calculations 
